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Abstract: International law had had a profound impact and influence on the domestic legal system in the contemporary world. 
However, the status of international law within the domestic legal system is not properly defined in many of the jurisdictions 
including Sri Lanka. In the absence of such a constitutional provision, the judiciary as the last bastion of hope has a responsibility 
of interpreting domestic law in light of the international standards that have been agreed upon by the country through 
ratification of international treaties and those principles of customary international law that has become binding on the country. 
However, too much judicial activism could jeopardize the constitutional fundamentals of separation of powers and the rule of 
law. Therefore, this study argues that the best way to resolve this issue is by providing a constitutional provision for the role of 
the judiciary in the recognition and implementation of international law in a domestic context. Using a qualitative methodology 
with a comparative analysis of the constitutional provisions of the selected jurisdictions of India and South Africa a proposal is 
made for a constitutional provision for the judicial role in the recognition and implementation of international law in Sri Lanka. 
The results have revealed that a constitutional provision would help to advance the separation of powers and the rule of law and 
to well define the role of the judiciary in absorbing international treaty law to the domestic sphere, making the law more certain 
and predictable and upholding the rights and duties of individuals in a domestic context while fulfilling international obligations 
of a country under the domestic legal system. 
  





In many countries, the constitution would act as the supreme law of the country, 
where for example, the Preamble of the 1978 Constitution of the Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sri Lanka recognizes that its Constitution shall be the supreme law of the 
country. It would normally have a mechanism for the recognition and implementation of 
domestic laws. While these rules of domestic law implementation may be less 
problematic, the same cannot be said when it comes to implementation of international 
law in domestic contexts and this is a well-documented area of international law when it 
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comes to implementation of international treaties in particular (Hishashi 2015).  
Therefore, there is a need for enacting similar provisions in the constitution of a country 
for the recognition and implementation of international law within the domestic legal 
system to get rid of the uncertainty or any ambiguity that may arise in its absence. 
However, this recognition and implementation of international law should be done 
complying with separation of powers and the rule of law coming under the broad 
spectrum of Constitutionalism, while always taking into consideration the sovereignty of 
the country as well. 
The separation of powers is an important tool for establishing an impartial and 
independent judiciary whose main function is to interpret and apply laws instead of 
creating substantive legal rules or norms concerning individual adjudication where the 
court is called upon to adjudicate on such a matter (Gerangelos 2009). On the other 
hand, rule of law, according to A. V. Dicey (Cosgrove 1981) is the supremacy of law 
above any other principle or precept. When it comes to the recognition and 
implementation of international law in a domestic context, upholding the notion of the 
rule of law is a vital consideration (Dyzenhaus 2005). One idea that comes under the 
broader notion of the rule of law is the idea of predictability and certainty of the law. It 
has often been found that, where there is an over-ambitious or overactive judiciary, the 
certainty of the law may be compromised as a matter of the judiciary’s notion of justice 
and fairness (Molot 2000).  
Therefore, this article looks at the different practices and attitudes of the judicial 
arm in the recognition and the implementation of international law in domestic 
contexts, whereby the practices, approaches, and the constitutional provisions of the 
selected jurisdictions of India and South Africa are analyzed for proposing an optimal 
constitutional model for allocating a proper role for the judiciary in recognition and 
implementation of international law in the domestic context of Sri Lanka.   
 
JUDICIARY AND TREATY LAW 
 
The executive is vested with the power of concluding treaties on behalf of the 
country. However, the executive is not allowed to directly bring international law without 
the participation or intervention of the legislature in many countries (Shelton 2011). This 
can also be justified under the notion of separation of powers since the law-making 
power is exclusively vested with the legislature. Against this backdrop, the respective 
role assigned to the judiciary is somewhat overlooked. This happens when the 
legislature fails to give effect to treaties that have been ratified by the executive by 
enacting enabling legislation to make such treaties a part of the domestic law. In such a 
situation the judiciary faces a dilemma in adhering to the broader notion of separation 
of powers and protecting the legitimate interest of the individuals who expect to yield 
the benefits from the treaties that have been ratified by the executive at the domestic 
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sphere, which concerns with the rights and duties of individuals. Therefore, it is argued 
that providing a proper constitutional guide as to the exact role of the judiciary 
concerning the recognition and implementation of international treaties at the domestic 
level would help the judiciary in not venturing into the law-making sphere which is left 
for the legislature under the separation of powers and to create certainty with 
uniformity of practice, thus enhancing the rule of law ideal of certainty of law.    
 
JUDICIARY AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The judiciary has a more significant and direct role to play in this regard. Once a 
litigant prays for a right or a duty that is derived from a principle of Customary 
International Law (CIL), the judiciary must decide on the existence and validity of such a 
CIL at the domestic level. In doing this, the judiciary is generally required to provide its 
interpretation as to the recognition and implementation of such rules of CIL in the 
domestic context. The judiciary being a forum for individuals to seek recourse against 
abuses of their rights and duties by the state, should have a systematic approach 
founded by a higher authority, such as the constitution to resolve such matters between 
the individuals and state, where the issue in question involves a principle of CIL (Haljan 
2013). Therefore, to avoid any conflicts between the other state organs and the judiciary, 
it is argued that the constitution itself should provide for the role of the judiciary 
regarding recognition and implementation of CIL at the domestic level to uphold the 
constitutional fundamentals of separation of powers and the rule of law.    
 
Constitutional Assignment of Judicial Powers and  
Functions Concerning International Law 
 
The judicial branch is given the competency for interpreting and applying the 
laws that are recognized as being valid under the constitution. The same applies to the 
interpretation and application of international law in a domestic context when such are 
put into question. The Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties (VCLT) under Article 31 (1) 
provides that treaties are required to be interpreted in good faith by giving effect to its 
ordinary meaning, considering the context, having regard to the object and purpose of 
such a treaty. While the provisions are applicable at the international level, it is argued 
that its relevance at the domestic level is unclear since there is no established CIL on the 
issue. This fact emphasizes the lack of uniformity regarding the interpretation of 
international law at the domestic level since if there was a uniformity of state practice, 
the provision in the VCLT would have become binding upon the states as a matter of 
CIL. Therefore, it is argued that the judiciary should be provided with a proper guideline, 
preferably through constitutional provisions concerning the interpretation of both treaty 
and customary international law principles at the domestic level by spelling out the 
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competencies of the judiciary in this regard. To induct a common method for providing 
a proper role and guidance on interpretation to the judiciary in the process of 
recognizing and implementing international law in a domestic context, the relevant 
judicial practices and attitudes of Sri Lanka, India, and South Africa are comparatively 




When one considers the judicial attitude and practices regarding the application 
of international law in the domestic context, there seems to be no coherence that could 
be discerned from the attitudes and practices of the Sri Lankan Judiciary. This is 
especially true concerning the application of law related to human rights (Sornarajah 
2016-2017). Article 4 (c) of the Constitution requires the judicial power of the people to 
be enforced through the courts established by Parliament. The judiciary is given the sole 
responsibility of adjudicating matters related to fundamental rights violations which 
result from executive and administrative actions under Article 126 (1) of the constitution. 
However, when it comes to the competencies of the judiciary regarding the recognition 
and implementation of international law at the domestic level, the Constitution has 
remained silent. This has created great confusion in predicting the use of international 
law principles by the Sri Lankan Courts. For example, in the case of (Visal Bhashitha 
Kavirathne and Others v W.M.N.J. Pushpakumara, Commissioner General of 
Examinations and Others 2012) the Court while referring to the fact that, right to 
education is even recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ended its 
examination on the substance of the matter by only pointing out the existence of such a 
right without going another step by explaining as to why the Sri Lankan law should be 
reflective of such a recognized right. Since many of the judgments where the Courts do 
refer to an international legal instrument, it ends right there with a mere reference 
instead of going ahead with a critical evaluation of such standards against the existing 
law of the country. 
The decided case law on this matter further exemplifies the non-uniformity of the 
judicial attitude and practices even concerning providing such lip service at least. In the 
case of (Leelawathie v Minister of Defence and External Affairs 1965), the question 
revolved around the refusal to grant registration of citizenship to a spouse. One of the 
questions for the court to decide was whether it amounted to a breach of the provisions 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The court declared that even 
though the UDHR was of the ‘highest legal order’, it formed no part of the law of Ceylon 
(as it was back then) since the UDHR is not an applicable law in Sri Lanka. The 
disappointing aspect of the decision is that the court did not venture into an inquiry as 
to whether the UDHR has become a part of the law of Ceylon through the principles of 
CIL.  
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In the (in) famous case of (Singarasa v Attorney General 2013), the question that 
the court had to decide was whether an individual had recourse under the optional 
protocol to the ICCPR to make a claim for violation of his rights as guaranteed under the 
ICCPR which was ratified by Sri Lanka in 1980. The Court in its opinion declared that, 
since Article 3 vests the sovereignty with the people and Article 4 declares as to how 
such powers are to be exercised, it would be a violation of this sovereignty if an external 
body was allowed to adjudicate on this matter apart from the Sri Lankan judiciary. The 
court also went on to hold that, the constitutional dynamics of the country adhere with 
a dualistic approach where there is a need for enabling legislation to be enacted by the 
Parliament if a particular provision in an international agreement ratified by the 
executive is to take effect at the domestic sphere. While the Court was bold enough to 
state that Sri Lanka was a dualist country, it failed to properly explain why it is the case 
with a reason (Sornarajah 2016-2017). 
The Court in its reasoning pointed out that the executive had no power to enact 
laws and anything done by the executive which violates the constitution is not valid. The 
Court explained that the accession to the optional protocol and the declaration made 
under Article 1 to the protocol thereof by the President back then, was inconsistent with 
Article 33 (h) of the constitution since it was not within the powers conferred upon the 
President by that Article. However, the court failed to make any reference to the 
provisions of the VCLT, where Article 46 provides that, as a general rule a state should 
not invoke the contention that its consent for a particular treaty was given in violation of 
its internal laws. The court did not make any effort to give a harmonized construction to 
make the law compatible with the country’s obligations at the international level. 
There have been some other instances in which the courts have taken a more 
purposive or some may call a teleological interpretation as to the recognition and 
implementation of international law in a Sri Lankan context. Often cited in this regard is 
the decision in (Bulankulama v Secretary, Ministry of Industrial Development and Others 
2000) where the Court held that, by becoming a contracting party to the United Nations, 
Sri Lanka is not allowed to escape the obligations and responsibilities cast upon it by the 
said United Nations. The Court opined that the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 and the 
Rio Convention of 1992 is endorsed by the United Nations, though may not be as 
binding as an Act of Parliament and be termed as ‘soft law’ is binding upon the 
government if they are either expressly enacted or are adopted by the Supreme Court in 
its decisions. 
Further, in the decision of (Weerawansa v Attorney-General and Others 2000) the 
Supreme Court used the provisions of the ICCPR in interpreting the Fundamental Rights 
guaranteed under the constitution of Sri Lanka. More recently, in the case of (Manohari 
Pelaketiya v Secretary of Minister of Education 2012), the Supreme Court used the 
provisions of the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) in interpreting the offense of sexual harassment at the workplace.  
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The Court reiterated the state’s obligations derived from both the Constitution 
and international law regarding the protection of women. In (Kariyawasam v Central 
Environmental Authority and Others 2019) the Court endorsed the decision in 
(Wijebanda v Conservator General of Forests 2009) which recognized that the right to 
environment is implicit in any meaningful interpretation of Article 12 of the Constitution. 
The Court went on to state that, while some of the international instruments may not be 
binding on the government, the principles therein can be recognized by the judiciary in 
making their pronouncements. 
The cases discussed above showcases a general uncertainty as to the attitudes 
and practices of the courts in recognizing and implementing international laws in the Sri 
Lankan context. While some decisions have utilized a monistic approach, some of the 
other decisions have applied a rigid dualistic approach. The zig-zag nature of these 
practices and attitudes does not help an individual who is trying to vindicate his rights, 
which may either arise from a ratified treaty or principles found under CIL. The matter is 
also exemplified by the fact even where the Courts have used international law in their 
interpretative endeavors, much of has remained mere lip service just to make good the 
judgment instead of bringing in substance for legal reasoning behind the arrival of a 
conclusion. 
Therefore, it is argued that Sri Lanka should endeavor to instill constitutional 
provisions for assigning a clearly defined role for the judiciary for the recognition and 




Indian Constitution has advocated for a dualistic approach when it comes to the 
recognition and implementation of treaty obligations and a monistic approach 
concerning the principles of CIL (Singh 2015). The judicial arm has always been praised 
for its activism in enhancing and protecting the rights of its citizenry and their role in 
recognition and implementation of international law at the domestic law has not 
provided any exceptions. In the case of (L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India 1997), the 
Court held that the judicial review process in India comprises of judicial review of the 
actions of the legislature, judicial review of the decisions of the judiciary itself, and 
administrative actions. Therefore, the role of the Indian judiciary regarding the 
recognition and implementation of international law must be studied in this 
background. 
In the case of (Vishaka v State of Rajastan 1997), the Indian Supreme Court held 
that, in the absence of effective measures to protect against sexual harassments under 
the domestic laws, recourse may be made to the International Agreements and their 
norms to give a purposive interpretation to Articles 14, 15 19(1)(g) and 21 of the 
constitution for providing safeguards against sexual harassment at the workplace.  
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The Court emphasized the need to interpret the fundamental rights as granted 
and protected under the constitution in light of the international standards where there 
is no conflict between such fundamental rights and international legal principles found 
upon such international laws and where harmony between the two is possible. 
 In (Kesavananda Bharathi v State of Kerala 1973) the Court observed that 
according to the provisions of Article 51 of the Constitution and to give effect to India’s 
obligations under international law, the Courts are required to interpret the Constitution 
in light of the outlining principles of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights. 
Sunil Agrawal (Agarwal 2010) comments that even where the Constitution or any other 
legislative enactment fails to provide for the proper role of the judiciary concerning the 
recognition and implementation of international law at the domestic level, through the 
use of judicial activism and its proactive attitude, it has been able to recognize and 
implement the international treaty and CIL obligations of the country to protect and 
advance the rights and liberties of individuals.  
The main significance of the Indian judiciary in comparison to the approach taken 
by its Sri Lankan counterpart lies in the use of international law in its interpretative 
process. Unlike in Sri Lanka, the Indian judiciary has gone far beyond than providing 
mere lip service in the use of international law, where international law coupled with the 
rights recognized under the constitution has been advanced to include rights that were 
not originally or directly recognized under the constitution such as the right to a clean 
and healthy environment (Rosencranz 2002). 
In a Sri Lankan context, what has been achieved by the judicial arm of India 
cannot be replicated since it would require a wholesome change in the judicial system 
where under the current constitutional setting, the Supreme Court is only allowed to 
scrutinize bills of Parliament, and the Parliament is precluded from reviving legislation 
under Article 80 (3) of the Constitution. Article 80 (3) of the 1978 Constitution of the 
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka provides that no court or tribunal shall call 
upon the validity of an Act of Parliament (even where it conflicts or otherwise repugnant 
with the provisions of the constitution). Therefore, putting in place a constitutional 
provision for the role of the judiciary concerning the recognition and    
 
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The 1996 Constitution provided constitutional provisions for recognition and 
implementation of both international agreements ratified by the Republic of South 
Africa and principles of CIL in the domestic sphere. It has not disappointed us with 
failing to mention the respective role of the judiciary in the recognition and 
implementation of international law in the domestic context either (Dugard 2005). 
Article 233 of the Constitution provides that; the courts must prefer an interpretation of 
legislation that is consistent with international law over any other interpretation which 
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may be inconsistent with international law. Article 39 of the Constitution which deals 
with the interpretation of the Bill of Rights as provided under Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution, states that the courts must consider international law when they interpret 
the substantive rights which are afforded to individuals. The use of the term ‘must 
consider’ is also of considerable importance since it obliges the judiciary to look into 
international law when they are interpreting the Bill of Rights since the same article 
gives a discretion for the courts in using foreign law as it uses the term ‘may’ instead of 
‘must’ which makes it clearer that there is a positive obligation on the part of the 
judiciary in using international law to interpret the provisions of the Bill of Rights.  
In the case of (S v Makwanyane 1995), the Court held that the term international 
law in this context involves both international treaty law and principles of CIL. In 
(Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001) the Court looked at the 
decisions of ECtHR and CEDAW in arriving at its decision. This clearly shows the 
progressive nature of the court in expanding the rights granted to individuals under the 
Bill of Rights. The 1996 South African Constitution under Article 172 grants the judiciary 
the power to review legislation and its compatibility with the Constitution. Dugard 
(Dugard 2005) opines that sometimes this provision is invoked to challenge legislations 
for being incompatible with international law since international law is made a part of 
the Constitution. However, in the case of (Azapo v President of the Republic of South 
Africa 1996), the Court held that the inquiry is only limited to determining whether the 
statute in question is inconsistent with the constitution and it does not extend finding 
out whether it is inconsistent with international law. 
The 1996 South African Constitution has once again led the way and shown the 
way to assign constitutional competencies regarding the role of the judiciary in 
recognition and implementation of international law at the domestic law. From a Sri 
Lanka perspective, the South African model does seem workable even under the current 
constitutional structure and therefore, it can be argued that this model is something 
that Sri Lankan lawmakers can easily adopt.   
 
GUIDE ON INTERPRETATIVE PROCESS FOR THE JUDICIARY 
 
The current Sri Lankan Constitution of 1978 does not provide any guideline for 
the interpretation of international law in the domestic sphere. The courts in the absence 
of any specific guidelines have used their measures and sense of justice and have given 
interpretations for the recognition and implementation of international law in the Sri 
Lankan context which has made it very difficult to create any certainty of the law which 
inevitably results in the breach of the constitutional fundamental of the rule of law which 
endeavors at making law certain in its application and interpretation to a given 
circumstance. Therefore, it is recommended that a constitutional provision be made for 
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guiding the judiciary on the use of international law concerning their duty of applying 
and interpreting law when they are required to do so. 
Out of the two selected jurisdictions, only the South African Constitution of 1996 
provides an interpretive guide for the interpretation and application of international law 
in a domestic context. The Indian experience has shown that through the premise of 
judicial activism, they have been able to apply and interpret domestic law in light of the 
principles and standards found under international law. Being the ultimate protector of 
the Constitution and the rights and liberties of its individuals, the Indian judiciary has 
also found a coherent way to interpret and apply international law in a domestic context 
and fulfill its obligation concerning the recognition and implementation of international 
law at the domestic context. 
The need for such provision in the Sri Lankan context (Table 1) is also made 
necessary since, under the current constitutional framework, courts are not allowed to 
question the constitutional validity of statutes passed by the legislature and hence 
having a proper guide on the interpretation and application of international law at the 
domestic sphere is intensified. 
 




Article x (A) The courts must interpret international law in a purposive manner to enable 
the state to fulfill its international obligations both at the international and 
domestic levels.  
 
Provided that where there is a possibility of interpreting a provision under 
several approaches, the courts must pick the approach which accords with the 
principles of international law.  
 
  (B) In interpreting domestic law considering international law, the courts: 
 
   (i) May presume that the legislature did not intend to legislate in a manner 
which would conflict or breach its international legal obligations; 
 
Provided where the Parliament has used unambiguous words as to their 
intention, the courts shall give effect to such notwithstanding any 
inconsistencies between domestic law and international law and 
domestic law.  
 
   (ii) Must presume that the common law
1
 did not intend to make law 





Article xx   The courts must interpret the fundamental rights granted to individuals 
under the constitution using the standards and principles as found 




                                                          
1
Refers to case law 
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It seems clear that allocating a proper role for the judiciary concerning the 
recognition and implementation of the international law in a domestic context would 
help to upkeep the constitutional fundamental of separation of powers, whereby 
demarking the role of the judiciary and spelling out what they can and cannot do, it will 
make sure that the judiciary will be stopped from usurping the legislative function in the 
disguise of judicial activism. Further to that, this kind of competence allocation coming 
from the Constitution will also help to keep the certainty of law which is a fundamental 
ideal coming under the broader notion of the rule of law. 
The comparative analysis made with India and South Africa does suggest that 
resolving any conflicts which may arise as a result of not allocating the sphere of 
competencies to the judicial branch could hamper the constitutional fundamentals of 
separation of powers and the rule of law, while the certainty of law would also have to 
be compromised as a result. Therefore, the suggested constitutional provisions would 
become helpful for a country such as Sri Lanka, where the status quo of the current 
constitutional arrangements are not international law friendly. Therefore, it could be 
concluded that providing a constitutional provision that allocates the judiciary with its 
role when it comes to the recognition and implementation of international law at the 
domestic level can be seen as a viable solution in the realization of the rights and duties 
of individuals granted under the international law as the adjudication of such rights and 
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